Argentīnas valdība - vēsture

Argentīnas valdība - vēsture

Valdības veids:
prezidenta republika
Kapitāls:
nosaukums: Buenosairesa

Administratīvās nodaļas:
23 provinces (provinces, vienskaitlis - provincia) un 1 autonoma pilsēta*; Buenosairesa, Katamarka, Čako, Čubuta, Buenosairesas Siudada Autonoma*, Kordova, Korjentesa, Entre Riosa, Formosa, Džujuja, La Pampa, La Rioja, Mendosa, Misiones, Neuquen, Rio Negro, Salta, San Juan, San Luis, Santakrusa, Santafē, Santjago del Estero, Tjerra del Fuego - Antartīda un Islas del Atlantiko Sur (Tjerra del Fuego - Antarktīda un Dienvidatlantijas salas), Tukumana
piezīme: ASV neatzīst pretenzijas uz Antarktīdu
Neatkarība:
1816. gada 9. jūlijs (no Spānijas)
Valsts svētki:
Revolūcijas diena (maija revolūcijas diena), 25. maijs (1810)
Konstitūcija:
vairākas iepriekšējās; pēdējais spēkā 1853. gada 11. maijā; daudzkārt grozīts, pēdējo reizi 1994. gadā (2016)
Legāla sistēma:
civiltiesību sistēma, kuras pamatā ir Rietumeiropas tiesību sistēmas; piezīme - 2015. gada vidū Argentīna pieņēma jaunu civilkodeksu, aizstājot veco, kas ir spēkā kopš 1871. gada
Starptautisko tiesību organizāciju dalība:
nav iesniedzis ICJ jurisdikcijas deklarāciju; pieņem ICCt jurisdikciju
Pilsonība:
pilsonība pēc dzimšanas: jā
pilsonība pēc izcelsmes: jā
dubultpilsonība atzīta: jā
uzturēšanās prasība naturalizācijai: 2 gadi
Vēlēšanu tiesības:
18-70 gadu vecumā; universāls un obligāts; 16-17 gadi - pēc vēlēšanām valsts vēlēšanās
Izpildvara:
valsts vadītājs: prezidents Mauricio MACRI (kopš 2015. gada 10. decembra); Viceprezidente Gabriela MICHETTI (kopš 2015. gada 10. decembra); piezīme - prezidents ir gan valsts vadītājs, gan valdības vadītājs
valdības vadītājs: prezidents Mauricio MACRI (kopš 2015. gada 10. decembra); Viceprezidente Gabriela MICHETTI (kopš 2015. gada 10. decembra)
kabinets: Prezidenta iecelts kabinets
vēlēšanas/iecelšana amatā: prezidents un viceprezidents, kas ievēlēti vienā balsojumā ar tautas balsojumu uz 4 gadu termiņu (ir tiesīgs otro termiņu pēc kārtas); vēlēšanas pēdējo reizi notika 2 kārtās 2015. gada 25. oktobrī un 22. novembrī (nākamās notiks 2019. gada oktobrī)
vēlēšanu rezultāti: Mauricio MACRI ievēlēts par prezidentu otrajā kārtā; balsu procenti pirmajā kārtā - Daniel SCIOLI (PJ) 37,1%, Mauricio MACRI (PRO) 34,2%, Sergio MASSA (FR/PJ) 21,4%, pārējie 7,3%; procentu balsu otrajā kārtā - Mauricio MACRI (PRO) 51,4%, Daniel SCIOLI (PJ) 48,6%
Likumdošanas nozare:
apraksts: divpalātu nacionālais kongress vai Congreso Nacional sastāv no:
Senāts (72 vietas; locekļi, kuri ar vienkāršu balsu vairākumu tiek tieši ievēlēti daudzu mandātu apgabalos, lai ieņemtu 6 gadu termiņu un vienu trešdaļu locekļu ievēlētu ik pēc 2 gadiem)
Deputātu palāta (257 vietas; locekļi, kas tiek tieši ievēlēti daudzu mandātu apgabalos ar proporcionālu pārstāvības balsojumu; locekļi ieņem 4 gadu termiņu, un puse locekļu tiek atjaunota ik pēc 2 gadiem)
vēlēšanām: Senāts - pēdējo reizi notika 2017. gada 22. oktobrī (nākamais notiks 2019. gada oktobrī)
Deputātu palāta - pēdējo reizi notika 2017. gada 22. oktobrī (nākamā notiks 2019. gada oktobrī)
vēlēšanu rezultāti: Senāts - procenti balsu pēc bloka vai partijas - NA; vietas pēc bloka vai ballītes - Cambiemos 12, UC 6, PJ 4, FRC 2
Deputātu palāta - procenti balsu pēc bloka vai partijas - NA; vietas pēc bloka vai ballītes - Cambiemos 61, UC 28, PJ 18, FR 7, FCS 3, FRC 2, citi 8
Tiesu nozare:
augstākā tiesa: Augstākā tiesa vai Korte Suprema (sastāv no tiesas priekšsēdētāja, viceprezidenta un 5 tiesnešiem)
tiesnešu izvēle un pilnvaru termiņš: tiesneši, kurus izvirza prezidents un apstiprina Senāts; tiesneši var strādāt līdz 75 gadu vecumam līdz obligātajai aiziešanai pensijā
pakļautās tiesas: federālā līmeņa apelācijas, rajona un teritoriālās tiesas; provinces līmeņa augstākās, apelācijas un pirmās instances tiesas
Politiskās partijas un līderi:
Kambiemosa [Mauricio MACRI] (CC-ARI, PRO un UCR koalīcija)
Pilsoņu vienotība jeb UC [Cristina FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER]
Pilsoniskā koalīcija ARI vai CC-ARI [Elisa CARRIO]
Pilsoniskā fronte Santjago vai FCS [Gerardo ZAMORA]
Disidentu peronisti (PJ Disidente) vai federālais peronisms (PJ labējā spārna, kas iebilst pret Kirhneriem) [Eduardo DUHALDE]
Fronte Saskaņas vai FRC atjaunošanai
Priekšgals uzvarai vai FpV (PJ kreisā frakcija) [Cristina FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER]
Juridiskā partija jeb PJ [Hosē Luiss GIOJA]
Progresisti [Margarita STOLBIZER]
Radikālā pilsoniskā savienība jeb UCR [Lilia PUIG DE STUBRIN]
Atjaunošanas fronte (Frente Renovador) vai FR [Sergio MASSA]
Republikāņu priekšlikums vai PRO [Mauricio MACRI]
Sociālistiskā partija vai PS [Antonio BONFATTI]
Apvienoti jaunai alternatīvai vai UNA (ietver FR)
daudzas provinces partijas


Kāda veida valdība ir Argentīnai?

Argentīna ir prezidenta demokrātiska republika, kurā prezidents ir valsts galva un valdības vadītājs, kā arī bruņoto spēku virspavēlnieks. Valdība darbojas trīs nozarēs: izpildvara, likumdevējs un tiesu vara. Prezidents ir visspēcīgākais no visiem trim valdības ieročiem, un viņam ir tiesības izstrādāt likumprojektus, izsludināt ārkārtas vai kara stāvokli un apturēt Konstitūciju.


Argentīna - politiskā pieredze

Argentīnas politiskā vēsture aizsākās sešpadsmitajā gadsimtā, kad spāņu pētnieki pirmo reizi apmeklēja šo reģionu. Spānija izveidoja pastāvīgu koloniju tagadējās Buenosairesas teritorijā 1580. gadā. 1776. gadā Spānija izveidoja R ío de la Plata viceprezidentu, un Argentīna kļuva par plaukstošu ostu un impērijas neatņemamu sastāvdaļu. 1816. gada 9. jūlijā Argentīna oficiāli pasludināja savu neatkarību no Spānijas Jos é de San Mart ín vadībā, kurš bija kontinentā dominējošais spēks valsts neatkarībai. Spāņu sakāve radīja ieilgušu konflikta periodu starp federālistu un centralistiskajiem spēkiem Argentīnā, lai noteiktu nācijas turpmāko struktūru. Argentīnas Republikas Konstitūcija tika izsludināta 1853. gadā. Konservatīvie spēki dominēja līdz 1916. gadam, kad Argentīnas prezidenta amatā tika ievēlēts Hipolito Yrigoyen, Uni ón C ívica Radical (UCR —Radical Civic Union) kandidāts, un pirmais bezmaksas populārais. vēlēšanas. Yrigoyen tika gāzts 1930. gadā ar militāru apvērsumu. Šis notikums Argentīnas politiskajā vēsturē izveidoja civilo un militāro valdību mijiedarbības modeli, kas pastāvēja līdz 1983. gada decembrim, kad prezidenta amatā stājās radikāļu kandidāts Ra úl Alfons ín. 1989. gada jūlijā Alfons ín nodeva varu savam konstitucionāli ievēlētajam pēctecim, pirmo reizi kopš 1928. gada.

Viens no Argentīnas vēstures mantojumiem ir Per ónism fenomens - masu kustība, kuru 1940. gadā radīja Huans Domingo Per ón, kurš nāca pie varas militārā apvērsuma laikā 1943. gadā. Per ón tika ievēlēts par prezidentu 1946. gadā, un 1948. gadā viņš izveidoja partiju Per ónista - kustību, kas vērsta uz sociālajām programmām un nacionālistisko ideoloģiju. Arodbiedrības un strādājošie nabadzīgie bija galvenais pamats Per ónism un 1951. gadā veicināja Per ón 's pārvēlēšanu prezidenta amatā. Pārsūdzēts 1955. gadā, Per ón atgriezās no trimdas 1973. gadā un tika atkārtoti ievēlēts par Argentīnas prezidentu. Viņš nomira amatā, un viņa sievas un administrācijas haoss izraisīja 1976. gada apvērsumu. Neraugoties uz to, ka daudzas valsts politiskās problēmas ir saistītas ar Per ónist periodu, ideoloģija joprojām ir spēcīgs spēks Argentīnas politikā, un tā radās būtībā nemainīga pēc 70. un 80. gadu militārās diktatūras. Valsts atgriezās demokrātijā 1983. gadā pēc septiņus gadus ilgas brutālas militārās varas. Militārās varas laikā vismaz 10 000 un varbūt pat 30 000 argentīniešu pazuda un#x0022 pazuda. Bijušo militāro vadītāju kriminālvajāšana, kas apsūdzēta cilvēktiesību pārkāpumos, joprojām ir būtisks jautājums valstī.

Ra úl Alfons ín tika ievēlēts par prezidentu 1983. gadā, taču viņam neizdevās izmantot bēguļo inflāciju, kas skāra valsti. Rezultātā Karloss Sauls Menems no Justicialist Partijas tika ievēlēts par prezidentu un notika pirmā varas nodošana no viena demokrātiski ievēlēta prezidenta citam valsts vēsturē. Bijušais futbolists Menems samazināja valdības izdevumus un liberalizēja ekonomiku, apžēloja bijušos militāros līderus un panāca ekonomisko un politisko stabilitāti. 1994. gadā viņš tika pārvēlēts. Lai gan viņš mēģināja piespiest konstitucionālas izmaiņas, kas ļautu viņam kandidēt uz trešo termiņu, viņš bija spiests pieņemt savu sāncensi Eduardo Duhalde kā tieslietu darbinieku un prezidenta kandidātu 1999. gadā. Duhalde zaudēja Fernando de la R ྪ UCR.

De la R ྪ stājās amatā 1999. gadā, apņemoties risināt valsts ekonomiskās problēmas, taču līdz 2001. gada sākumam ekonomika vēl vairāk nonāca recesijā. Starptautiskais Valūtas fonds (SVF) piegādāja ASV USD 22,7 miljardu ārkārtas palīdzība divās daļās (janvārī un augustā), kas izrādījās par maz. Līdz 2001. gada decembrim, valstij virzoties uz ekonomiskā sabrukuma robežas, nemiernieku protestētāji piespieda de la R ྪ 's atkāpties. Pēc tam Argentīna nepildīja savas saistības ASV $ 155 miljardi ārvalstu parāda maksājumu, kas ir lielākais šāds saistību nepildīšanas gadījums vēsturē. Pēc nestabilitātes perioda, kad trīs kandidāti dažu dienu laikā pēc kārtas pieņēma un atkāpās no prezidenta amata, 2002. gada 1. janvārī Kongress nosauca Eduardo Duhaldi par prezidentu. Duhalde drīz paziņoja par ekonomikas plānu, kas devalvē Argentīnas peso, kas desmit gadus bija piesaistīts dolāram. . Devalvācija ienesa banku nozari krīzē un iznīcināja lielu daļu vidusšķiras ietaupījumu. Tūkstošiem cilvēku sāka pamest valsti, galvenokārt uz Itāliju un Spāniju, tūkstošiem citu izgāja ielās, dauzot katlus un pannas, protestējot pret viņu finanšu stāvokli.

Argentīna ir republika, kuras valsts vadība ir uzticēta prezidentam, kurš no 1995. līdz 2001. gadam tika ievēlēts ik pēc četriem gadiem. Prezidents var gūt panākumus amatā. Nacionālo kongresu (Congreso Nacional) veido 72 vietas Senāts, kura locekļi tiek ievēlēti uz sešiem gadiem, un 252 deputātu palāta, kuras locekļi tiek ievēlēti uz četriem gadiem. Vēlēšanu vecums ir 18 gadi, un balsošana ir obligāta visiem argentīniešiem vecumā no 18 līdz 70 gadiem.


Argentīnas valdība

valsts vadītājs: prezidents Alberto Eņģelis FERNANDEZS (kopš 2019. gada 10. decembra) Priekšsēdētāja vietniece Kristīna FERNANDEZA DE KIRNERA (kopš 2019. gada 10. decembra) piezīme - prezidents ir gan valsts vadītājs, gan valdības vadītājs

valdības vadītājs: prezidents Alberto Eņģelis FERNANDEZS (kopš 2019. gada 10. decembra) Viceprezidente Kristīna FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER (kopš 2019. gada 10. decembra)

kabinets: Prezidenta iecelts kabinets

vēlēšanas/iecelšana amatā: prezidents un viceprezidents, kas ievēlēti vienā balsojumā ar kvalificētu balsu vairākumu (lai uzvarētu, kandidātam jāsaņem vismaz 45% balsu jeb 40% balsu un 10 punktu pārsvars pār otro vietu kandidātu, ja ne notiek, tiek rīkota otrā kārta) prezidents ieņem četru gadu termiņu (piemērots otram termiņam pēc kārtas), vēlēšanas, kas pēdējo reizi notika 2019. gada 27. oktobrī (nākamais notiks 2023. gada oktobrī)

vēlēšanu rezultāti: Alberto Angels FERNANDEZ ievēlēts par prezidentu procentos balsu - Alberto Angel FERNANDEZ (TODOS) 48,1%, Mauricio MACRI (PRO) 40,4%, Roberto LAVAGNA (neatkarīgs) 6,2%, citi 5,3%

Pilsonības kritēriji:

pilsonība pēc izcelsmes: jā

dubultpilsonība atzīta: jā

uzturēšanās prasība naturalizācijai: 2 gadi

Legāla sistēma:

Vēlēšanu tiesības:

Likumdošanas nodaļa:

apraksts: divpalātu nacionālais kongress vai Congreso Nacional sastāv no:

Senāts (72 mandātu locekļi, kas ar vienkāršu balsu vairākumu tiek tieši ievēlēti daudzu mandātu apgabalos, lai ieņemtu 6 gadu termiņu un vienu trešdaļu locekļu ievēlētu ik pēc 2 gadiem)

Deputātu palāta (257 mandātu locekļi, kas tieši ievēlēti daudzu deputātu vēlēšanu apgabalos ar proporcionālu pārstāvību balsstiesīgie locekļi ieņem četru gadu pilnvaru termiņu, un puse locekļu tiek atjaunota ik pēc 2 gadiem)

Senāts - pēdējo reizi notika 2019. gada 27. oktobrī (nākamais notiks 2021. gada oktobrī)

Deputātu palāta - pēdējo reizi notika 2019. gada 27. oktobrī (nākamā notiks 2021. gada oktobrī)

vēlēšanu rezultāti: Senāts - procenti balsu pēc bloka vai partijas - NA vietas pēc bloka vai partijas - TODOS 13, Cambiemos 8, FCS 2, JSRN 1

Deputātu palāta - procenti balsu pēc bloka vai partijas - NA vietas pa blokiem vai partijām - TODOS 64, Cambiemos 56, CF 3, FCS 3, JSRN 1, citi 3

Tiesu nodaļa:

augstākā tiesa: Augstākā tiesa vai Korte Suprema (sastāv no tiesas priekšsēdētāja, viceprezidenta un 5 tiesnešiem)

tiesneša izvēle un pilnvaru termiņš: tiesneši, kurus izvirzījis prezidents un apstiprinājuši Senāta tiesneši, var strādāt līdz obligātajai aiziešanai pensijā 75 gadu vecumā

pakļautās tiesas: federālā līmeņa apelācijas, apgabaltiesas un teritoriālās tiesas provinces augstākās, apelācijas un pirmās instances tiesas

Reģioni vai valstis:

23 provinces (provinces, vienskaitlis - provincia) un 1 autonoma pilsēta* Buenosairesa, Katamarka, Čako, Čubuta, Buenosairesas Siudadas autonomā pilsēta*, Kordova, Korjentesa, Entre Riosa, Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, La Rioja, Mendoza, Misiones , Neuquen, Rio Negro, Salta, San Juan, San Luis, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero, Tierra del Fuego - Antartida e Islas del Atlantico Sur (Tierra del Fuego), Tukumana

piezīme: ASV neatzīst nekādas pretenzijas uz Antarktīdu

Politiskās partijas un līderi:

Kambiemosa [Mauricio MACRI] (CC-ARI, PRO un UCR koalīcija)

Pilsoņu vienotība jeb UC [Cristina FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER]

Pilsoniskā koalīcija ARI vai CC-ARI [Elisa CARRIO]

Pilsoniskā fronte Santjago vai FCS [Gerardo ZAMORA]

Disidentu peronisti (PJ Disidente) vai federālais peronisms (PJ labējā spārna, kas iebilst pret Kirhneriem) [Eduardo DUHALDE]

Fronte Saskaņas vai FRC atjaunošanai

Priekšgals uzvarai vai FpV (PJ kreisā frakcija) [Cristina FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER]

Juridiskā partija jeb PJ [Hosē Luiss GIOJA]

Progresisti [Margarita STOLBIZER]

Radikālā pilsoniskā savienība jeb UCR [Lilia PUIG DE STUBRIN]

Atjaunošanas fronte (Frente Renovador) vai FR [Sergio MASSA]

Republikāņu priekšlikums vai PRO [Mauricio MACRI]

Sociālistiskā partija vai PS [Antonio BONFATTI]

Apvienoti jaunai alternatīvai vai UNA (ietver FR)

daudzas provinces partijas

Starptautisko tiesību organizācijas dalība:

Starptautiskās organizācijas dalība:

Diplomātiskā pārstāvniecība ASV:

misijas vadītājs: vēstnieks Fernando ORIS DE ROA (kopš 2018. gada 24. janvāra)

kanceleja: 1600 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Vašingtona, DC 20009

ģenerālkonsulāts (-i): Atlanta, Čikāga, Hjūstona, Losandželosa, Maiami, Ņujorka, Vašingtona, Kolumbija

ASV diplomātiskā pārstāvniecība:

misijas vadītājs: vēstnieks (vakants) pilnvarotais lietvedis Toms Kūnijs (kopš 2017. gada 20. janvāra)

vēstniecība: Avenida Colombia 4300, C1425GMN Buenosairesa

pasta adrese: starptautiskais pasts: izmantojiet vēstniecības ielas adresi APO adrese: ASV vēstniecība Buenosairesa, vienība 4334, APO AA 34034


Finansiāls stimuls

Argentīnai bija finansiāls stimuls pieņemt šos vīriešus. Turīgi vācieši un vācu izcelsmes Argentīnas uzņēmēji bija gatavi maksāt ceļu par bēgšanu no nacistiem. Nacistu līderi izlaupīja neskaitāmus miljonus no nogalinātajiem ebrejiem, un daļa no šīs naudas pavadīja viņus uz Argentīnu. Daži gudrāki nacistu virsnieki un līdzstrādnieki jau 1943. gadā ieraudzīja rakstīto pie sienas un sāka izvārīt zeltu, naudu, vērtslietas, gleznas un daudz ko citu, bieži vien Šveicē. Antes Pāveliča un viņa tuvu padomdevēju rokās atradās vairākas lādes, kas bija pilnas ar zeltu, rotaslietām un mākslu, kuras viņi bija nozaguši saviem ebreju un serbu upuriem: tas ievērojami atviegloja viņu nokļūšanu Argentīnā. Viņi pat atmaksājās britu virsniekiem, lai izlaistu viņus caur sabiedroto līnijām.


Argentīna: Baznīcas hronoloģija

Apustulis Pārlijs P. Prats un viņa sieva Fēbe kalpoja piecu mēnešu misijā Čīlē. Čīlē pavadītajā laikā viņi nolēma, ka ir nepieciešams Mormona grāmatas tulkojums spāņu valodā.

1886 • Soltleiksitija, Juta

Tika publicēts Mormona grāmatas tulkojums spāņu valodā.

1923–25 • Buenosairesa, Argentīna

Frīdrihu un Hopju ģimenes, no Vācijas atgriezušās, pārcēlās uz Buenosairesu un sāka rīkot sapulces savās mājās un aicināt kaimiņus. Viņi rakstīja Baznīcas vadītājiem, aicinot viņus sūtīt misionārus uz Argentīnu.

1925. gada decembris • Buenosairesa

Liniers filiāle, pirmā filiāle Argentīnā, tika izveidota Buenosairesā. Pirmie Argentīnā tika kristīti seši jauni biedri.

1925. gada 25. decembris • Buenosairesa

Elders Melvins J. Balards no Divpadsmit apustuļu kvoruma veltīja visu Dienvidameriku evaņģēlija sludināšanai.

Pirmā spāņu valodā runājošā Eladija Cifuentesa tika kristīta.

Reinholds Stoofs tika iecelts par jaunizveidotās Dienvidamerikas misijas prezidentu.

1931. gada 28. jūlijs • Buenosairesa

Luidži un Mariantonija Notaro ziedoja savu īpašumu Tonelero ielā Linjē apkaimē pirmās sanāksmju nama celtniecībai Argentīnā.

1934. gada 14. februāris • Buenosairesa

Palīdzības biedrība tika organizēta Argentīnas misijā, kuras prezidente bija Karmena de Eskudero.

1935. gada 30. septembris • Buenosairesa

Pirmā sākumskola Argentīnā tika organizēta Linjē filiālē, kuras prezidenta amatā bija Angela Mericia de Peyrera.

1937. gada 9. janvāris • Argentīna

Pirmo reizi tika publicēts Argentīnas misijas spāņu valodas izdevums El mensajero (vēstnesis).

Bony un Oguey ģimenes, Šveices imigranti, atveda Baznīcu uz Kordovas apgabalu.

Argentīnas valdība krasi samazināja vīzas, kas izsniegtas misionāriem no ASV.

1939. gada 19. aprīlis • Bahía Blanca, Argentīna

Luiss Kostantīni tika aicināts kā misionārs Bahía Blanca. Viņš bija pirmais no daudziem biedriem, kuri tika aicināti sludināt savās vietējās teritorijās.

Misijas prezidents Džeimss L. Bārkers un viņa sieva Keita palika pārraudzīt Baznīcu Argentīnā, un vietējie vadītāji tika aicināti vadīt savas filiāles.

1943. gada 14. oktobris • Buenosairesa

Ursula Bonda, Linjēra filiāles locekle, pirmo ziedojumu veica turpmākajā tempļa celtniecībā Argentīnā gadu desmitiem pirms tempļa izziņošanas.

Sesila S. Janga, Argentīnas misijas Palīdzības biedrības prezidente, organizēja Palīdzības biedrību visā valstī.

1944. gada 6. – 9. Janvāris • Buenosairesa

Argentīnā notika pirmā jauniešu konference.

Lyman un Afton Shreeve un viņu bērni kļuva par pirmajiem Ziemeļamerikas misionāriem, kas tika nosūtīti uz Argentīnu pēc Otrā pasaules kara. Drīz sekoja vairāk.

1952. gada janvāris – februāris • Argentīna

Vietējie brāļi tika aicināti vadīt lielāko daļu rajonu un visas filiāles visā valstī.

1954. gada 3. februāris • Buenosairesa

Prezidents Deivids O. Makkejs apmeklēja biedrus Argentīnā, atļāva būvēt sanāksmju telpas visā valstī un tikās ar Argentīnas prezidentu Huanu Peronu.

1955. gada aprīlis • Soltleiksitija

Baznīcas starptautiskā publikācija Liahona tika izdota spāņu valodā. El mensajero darbība tika pārtraukta.

Pakāpeniska sanāksmju nama celtniecības programma ļāva Argentīnā līdz 1965. gadam uzbūvēt 20 jaunas sanāksmju telpas, paredzot papildus 78.

Īpašā uzlabošanas laikmeta izdevumā, kurā tika uzsvērts Baznīcas progress Dienvidamerikā, bija raksts par Argentīnas misiju.

1966. gada 20. novembris • Buenosairesa

Tika organizēts Buenosairesas Argentīnas stabs, pirmais spāņu valodā runājošais stabs Dienvidamerikā, un par staba prezidentu bija Angels Abrea.

Buenosairesas Argentīnas staba prezidentūras staba Jaunie vīrieši sāka organizēt semināru un institūtu nodarbības visā valstī.

1975. gada 7. – 9. Marts • Buenosairesa

Prezidents Spensers V. Kimbols vadīja Argentīnas, Čīles, Paragvajas un Urugvajas locekļu apgabala konferenci.

1978. gada 30. oktobris • Sanpaulu, Brazīlija

Pēc Sanpaulu Brazīlijas tempļa iesvētīšanas Argentīnas svētie sāka organizēt braucienus ar autobusu, lai apmeklētu templi.

1980. gada 23. novembris • La Plata, Argentīna

Argentīnas 20. likme tika organizēta La Platā.

Angels Abrea tika uzaicināts uz Septiņdesmito pirmo kvorumu, pirmo Dienvidamerikas vispārējo autoritāti.

1986. gada 17. – 19. Janvāris • Buenosairesa

Buenosairesas Argentīnas templi iesvētīja Pirmās prezidentūras prezidents Tomass S. Monsons. Angelu Abreju sauca par tempļa prezidentu.

1994. gada 5. marts • Buenosairesa

Buenosairesas Argentīnas tempļa teritorijā tika izveidots misionāru mācību centrs.

1996. gada 25. februāris • Bariloče, Argentīna

Tika organizēts Bariloche Argentina Stake, 50. Argentīnā.

1996. gada 11. novembris • Buenosairesa

Prezidents Gordons B. Hinklijs runāja uz gandrīz 50 000 pēdējo dienu svēto pulcēšanos Buenosairesas futbola stadionā Estadio de Velez Sarsfield.

1998 • Dienvidamerikas dienvidu apgabals

Svētie visā Argentīnā, Čīlē, Urugvajā un Paragvajā piedalījās kopīgā kalpošanas dienā, atzīmējot Baznīcas mormoņu palīdzības programmu sākumu.

Svētie visā Dienvidamerikā svinēja Baznīcas 75. gadadienu kontinentā.

2014. gada 21. februāris • Buenosairesa

Elders M. Rasels Balards no Divpadsmit apustuļu kvoruma atgriezās parkā, kur viņa vectēvs veltīja Dienvidameriku, un viņš veltīja veltīšanas lūgšanu īpaši Argentīnai.

Argentīnas Kordovas templi iesvētīja Pirmās prezidentūras prezidents Dīters F. Uhtdorfs.

2017. gada 1. aprīlis • Soltleiksitija

Cristina B. Franco, dzimtā no Buenosairesas, tika uzaicināta par otro padomnieci Primārajā Vispārējā prezidijā.

2018. gada 1. aprīlis • Soltleiksitija

Prezidents Rasels M. Nelsons paziņoja par tempļa celtniecību Saltā.


Netīrs Argentīnas karš un pāreja uz demokrātiju

Tas bija viens no tumšākajiem periodiem Latīņamerikas vēsturē. No 1976. līdz 1983. gadam nežēlīga militārā hunta valdīja Argentīnā tā dēvētajā “netīrajā karā”, kad tika “pazuduši” aptuveni 10 000 cilvēku un plaši izplatījās cilvēktiesību pārkāpumi. Domājams, ka daudzus pazudušos šajos gados ir nolaupījuši Argentīnas valdības aģenti; pazudušie bieži tika spīdzināti un nogalināti, pirms viņu ķermeņi tika noglabāti lauku apvidos vai nemarķētos kapos. Atbildot uz to, radās kustība ar nosaukumu “Plaza de Mayo laukuma mātes”, kas valkāja zīmes ar savu bērnu fotogrāfijām un vārdiem, kuri bija pazuduši, stāvot klusā protestā.

Hunta palika pie varas, līdz Argentīnas krīzes ekonomika un diemžēl neveiksmīgais mēģinājums sagrābt no Apvienotās Karalistes Folklendu/Malvīnas salas vēl vairāk iedragāja atlikušo uzticamības daļu. Militārie vadītāji, ar dažiem pārliecinošiem ASV un citiem, atkāpās no vispārējām vēlēšanām 1983. gada 30. oktobrī un#8212, un pārsteidzošā Peronistu partijas sakāve iezīmēja konstitucionālās varas atgriešanos. Tajā piedalījās vairāk nekā 85% balsstiesīgo.

Atgriežoties pie demokrātijas, Argentīna un ASV izveidoja ļoti ciešas divpusējās attiecības, ko uzsvēra prezidenta Klintones vizīte Argentīnā 1997. gada oktobrī. 1998. gada jūlijā ASV valdība atzina Argentīnu par galveno sabiedroto, kas nav NATO. 2016. gada martā prezidents Baraks Obama godināja netīrā kara upurus un lika deklasificēt tūkstošiem ar šo periodu saistītu militāro un izlūkošanas dokumentu. Mārtiņš Andersens, ADST līdzstrādnieks, atbildot uzrakstīja CNN op.

Džons Bušnels kalpoja par sekretāra palīga vietnieku Valsts departamenta Amerikas lietu birojā (ARA), ko tagad sauc par WHA (1977-1982), un misijas vadītāja vietnieku Buenosairesā (1982-1987). 1997. gadā viņu intervēja Džons Hārters un skaidro situāciju, kas noveda pie netīrā kara, un vardarbīgo Montonero radikāļu brutālo taktiku. Vēlāk viņš apspriež pāreju uz demokrātiju un raksturo savas sarunas ar vairākiem ģenerāļiem un centienus atbalstīt jaunievēlēto valdību, lai kāda tā būtu. Roberts Stīvens bija Buenosairesas vēstniecības politiskais darbinieks (1976–1977) un apgalvo, ka Argentīna ir “tikai vēl viena banānu republika”, neskatoties uz tās saistību ar Eiropu, 2001. gadā viņu intervēja Čārlzs Stjuarts Kenedijs.

Gerijs S. Ūrijs strādāja par konsulāro amatpersonu Buenosairesas vēstniecībā (1976–1978) un apspriež, kā Argentīna bija tikai “tranzītvalsts” tur dzīvojošajiem argentīniešiem, 2002. gada marta sākumā viņu intervēja Kenedijs. Entonijs Frīmens tika norīkots Buenosairesā kā darba atašeja palīgs (1976-1980). Dons R. Kienzle viņu intervēja 1995. gadā. Roberts B. Morlijs bija ARA politikas plānošanas koordinators no 1979. līdz 1982. gadam un apspriež slikti iecerēto Folklenda/Malvinas iebrukumu, ar kuru Kenedijs viņu intervēja, sākot ar 1997. gada jūliju. Nikolass Robertsons tika norīkots darbā USIS Buenosairesā kā sabiedrisko lietu asistenta palīgs (1984-1988), un Kenedijs viņu intervēja 2009. gadā.

Varat arī izlasīt par Huanu un Evu Peron, kā arī Džona Bušnela stāstu par ASV iebrukumu Panamā.. Varat arī uzzināt vairāk par Čīles pāreju uz demokrātiju.

Tragedijas priekšspēle

Džons Bušnels
ARA, 1977-82 DCM Buenosairesa, 1982-87

BUSHNELL: 70. gadu sākumā un vidū Argentīnas situācija gandrīz visos veidos pasliktinājās. 1973. gadā ģenerālis Huans Perons (kreisajā pusē), kurš vadīja Argentīnu no 1943. līdz 1955. gadam, atgriezās no ilgas trimdas Spānijā un tika ievēlēts par prezidentu. Viņa trešā sieva, kas bija bijusi bāra dejotāja Panamā, kandidēja kā viņa viceprezidents. Perons nomira 1974. gada jūlijā, un viņa sieva kļuva par prezidentu, lai gan viņai nebija politiskas vai vadības pieredzes.

Ekonomika turpināja pasliktināties, un politiskās un ekonomiskās problēmas pavēra durvis Mario Firmeniča vadītajiem Montonero partizāniem. Montonero motīvi un mērķi bija sarežģīti, un viņi sevi uzskatīja par trockistiem vai tautas partizāniem.

Bet daudzi viņu atbalstītāji bija no Maskavas noskaņotās komunistiskās partijas, un daži no viņu biedriem šķita galvenokārt ieinteresēti naudā. Viņi nosūtīja lielu daļu naudas uz Havanu glabāšanai un#8212, lai gan Havanna, protams, nebija pazīstama kā banku centrs. Galu galā lielākā daļa izdzīvojušo vadību aizbēga uz Kubu un no turienes galu galā devās uz Nikaragvu, lai palīdzētu sandinistiem. Montoneros bija sabiedroti ar lauku un vēl radikālāku, bet mazāku grupu, ko sauca par ERP, revolucionāro tautas armiju.

Montoneros vadīja vardarbīgas demonstrācijas par labu Perona atgriešanai. Bet, kad viņš atgriezās, viņu vardarbībā un nolaupīšanā nebija pauzes.… Vairāki amerikāņu vadītāji tika nolaupīti par izpirkuma maksu. Viņi nolaupīja Argentīnas milzu graudu un pārtikas produktu uzņēmuma Bunge & amp Born vadītāju un savāca aptuveni 10 vai 12 miljonus dolāru. Izpilddirektoros tika nogalināti ķermeņa sargi šaušanas laikā, tika nogalināti vadītāji, sargi, Montoneros un apkārtējie. Lai gan viņi organizēja dažas lauku partizānu aktivitātes un mācību nometnes, Montoneros galvenokārt darbojās pilsētās.

Līdz 1975. gadam viņi Buenosairesā lielāko nakti iesaistījās ieroču cīņās ar policiju, nogalinot daudzus nevainīgus apkārtējos, kā arī daudzus militāros/policistus un Montoneros. Buenosairesa kļuva par savvaļas rietumiem sliktākajā laikā. Naktī, kad viņš gatavoja vakariņas aptuveni 70 vai 80 cilvēkiem, viņi iešāva raķeti Amerikas vēstnieka rezidences ēdamzālē. Par laimi, daži viesi kavējās un ballīte vēl nebija iegājusi ēdamzālē, kad raķete trāpīja, neviens netika nogalināts, taču acīmredzot nolūks bija nogalināt daudzus.

1976. gada militāro apvērsumu atbalstīja 95 procenti cilvēku. Pēc tam militāristi pastiprināja netīro karu, galveno uzmanību pievēršot Montonero infrastruktūrai. HA [Humanitārās lietas, Valsts departamenta Cilvēktiesību birojs, ko tagad sauc par DRL], vienmēr citētu skaitļus par pazudušajiem un spīdzinātajiem, kurus, iespējams, militārpersonas spīdzināja.

Tomēr noteikti Montoneros cīnījās vismaz tikpat netīri un neņemot vērā apkārtējos. Ļaujiet man ilustrēt ar pāris gadījumiem, kurus es zinu no personīgajiem sakariem.

Kādam armijas ģenerālim, kurš dzīvoja Buenosairesas dzīvoklī, bija meita, varbūt 14, kas uzaicināja viena vecuma skolas draugu uz naktsmieru, jo vardarbības dēļ cilvēki naktī nevarēja iziet. Šī meitene pienāca klāt, nolika čemodānu zem gultas, un nakts vidū čemodāns uzspridzinājās un nogalināja meitenes, ģenerāli, viņa sievu un pārējo ģimeni, un guva partizānu panākumus. Šāda veida lieta piesaistīja militārpersonu uzmanību. Un tas nebija atsevišķs gadījums.

Kamēr es 1978. gadā strādāju ARA [Valsts departamenta Amerikas lietu birojā, ko tagad sauc par WHA], Montoneros uzbruka Valteram Klīnam, kurš bija finanšu sekretārs un strādāja kopā ar mani Valsts kasē, uzsākot mūsu ekonomiskās attiecības ar Argentīnu pēc valsts apvērsuma . Valsti pārņēma militārpersonas, bet viņi izveidoja civilu komandu, lai vadītu ekonomiku.

Valtera Klīna māja kopā ar viņu un viņa ģimeni tika sabombardēta, sienas, jumts un viss nokrita. Martiness De Hozs, kurš bija ekonomikas ministrs, gandrīz uzreiz uzzināja par šo uzbrukumu un devās uz šo teritoriju. Viņš redzēja postījumus un konfiscēja celtņus no tuvējiem būvlaukumiem, lai izvilktu lielos cementa gabalus, lai glābtu ģimeni. Valters netika nopietni ievainots. Viens bērns tika smagi ievainots un joprojām cieš no šī uzbrukuma. Un Kleinu ģimenei paveicās! …

Militārpersonas uzņēma cilvēkus, kuri, viņuprāt, atradās partizānu infrastruktūrā, no kuriem lielākā daļa bija infrastruktūrā, bet daži nebija, un šie cilvēki nekad vairs netiks redzēti. Viņi tiktu spīdzināti, lai atrastu citus cilvēkus infrastruktūrā. Daži tika izmesti no lidmašīnām okeānā, lielākā daļa tika nogalināti un apglabāti.

Arestētās grūtnieces tiks turētas cietumā līdz bērna piedzimšanai. Tad viņi varētu pazust, un bērnu paņemtu militāra ģimene vai kāds, kas saistīts ar izlūkdienestu, kurš vēlējās adoptēt bērnu.…

"Viņi atrada vairākus līķus, kas sakrauti uz lauka un burtiski uzspridzināti"

Roberts Stīvens
Buenosairesas vēstniecības politiskais darbinieks, 1976-1977

STEVENS: Tas būtībā bija… politiskās situācijas sabrukums. Argentīnā bija tādi paši valdības un ekonomisko katastrofu apgrozījumi, kas bija raksturīgi tik ilgi tādām vietām kā Itālija.

Ļoti labi zināmais komentārs ir tik klišejisks, bet tā ir taisnība, ka Argentīnai ir resursi. Tā ir viena no turīgākajām valstīm pasaulē, un apmēram līdz 20. gadiem Argentīna tika uzskatīta par vienu no bagātākajām un daudzsološākajām valstīm pasaulē. Un tā kā to apdzīvo argentīnieši, tā ir bijusi katastrofa. Atkal, pat šodien viņiem ir problēmas ar SVF [Starptautisko Valūtas fondu].…

Argentīnā nekas nemainās, un Perona pieredze, protams, bija pakļāvusi viņus diktatoriskai valdībai. Es domāju, ka tajā laikā, kad Argentīnas armija nolēma pārcelties, viņiem šķita, ka valsts atkal atrodas šajā katastrofālajā situācijā un kaut kas ir jādara.

Man ir privāts viedoklis, ko nekad neesmu redzējis neviena zinātnieka vai labāk kvalificēta cilvēka pausta, ka, iespējams, Argentīnas armiju iedvesmoja tas, ko viņi bija redzējuši Čīlē, ka viņi redzēja, ka viņu kolēģi pāri kalniem pārņem un pārņem gūt panākumus ekonomikā, vismaz klasiskā produktu un ārvalstu valūtas rezervju izteiksmē, un ka, iespējams, viņi varētu darīt to pašu Argentīnas labā.

Nu, viņi nebija vieni un tie paši cilvēki, un tas nedarbojās Argentīnā. Man kultūra ir liela daļa no tā. You’re talking about Mediterranean culture, which has a different outlook on life and efficiency in government than, say, the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon culture, just a very different thing.

Whereas Chile today is stable and economically in pretty good shape, Argentina is not. I think the Argentina military may have deluded themselves into the idea that they could do the same thing the Chilean military had done. Of course, there was also the terrorist factor, the fact that people were being assassinated in Argentina.…

We had considerable security precautions as Americans moving around in Argentina than we had ever had in Chile. The Argentine military were much more brutal, openly so. One of the worst examples we saw of that was – I forget the exact circumstances – they found a number of bodies of people who had been apparently killed by the Argentina military police piled in a field with a large charge under them and literally blown up. There were body parts all over the field.

And everyone said, “What on earth! What are they trying to signal to their people and to the world?” And the basic signal, we all agreed, was very clear: “We’re in charge. We can do any damn thing we want, and if you don’t behave yourself, this is what’s going to happen to you.”

The business of tossing people out of aircraft: we all like to think at least that they were heavily drugged or dead before they were thrown out, but who knows? But bodies started washing up in the River Plate estuary in Uruguay, and the Uruguayans complained, “What in the hell is going on here? We don’t want these bodies washing up on our shores.”

This was a government that didn’t even care enough to fly coroners out to the bodies to bring them back in. That resulted, of course, later – a different subject entirely — in the Falklands War when the Argentine military, losing popularity, seeing that the opposition was increasingly gathered its strength, desperately reached for the old classic idea: find an external enemy, and thought “If we invade the Falklands, we will get our people united behind us.”

It was the disaster that brought them down and ended them all in jail with trials and so on….

“Chile was ideological, like Spain, but Argentina was just another banana republic”

I think my own impression of it was that we were less involved [in Argentina]. We had been deeply involved in what was happening in Chile because of the Allende government and so on.

In Argentina it was more sort of a normal distance. We were interested, but I don’t think we were as much involved. My impression has always been, both from what I’ve read since and what I knew then, that we were not really involved in the coup. I have no idea whether we even knew it was coming.

But it was just sort of a little bit more laid back, watching what they were doing and scratching our heads trying to figure it out at times. Yes, protesting the human rights abuses when we could. Americans were not as directly affected. I don’t think that any Americans were killed over there. Very few Americans gave a damn what went on in Argentina. The government didn’t focus on it, the press didn’t focus much on it….

Chile was ideological, like Spain, but Argentina was just another banana republic. Who’s in, who’s out, so what? They’d had the military in before. The governments changed. It just didn’t excite people as much as what happened over in Chile.

Chile in a sense to me – I probably would get thrown out if I talked about this among certain circles — Chile was a serious country, and what happened in Chile made a difference to people. It was important, I think, that Chile be restored to democracy. In Argentina, what happened, so what? In a year or two it would change anyway, and they never had been able to govern themselves very well, so what did we really expect?

In Chile we had seen the loss of a long democratic tradition of good self-government. In Argentina we didn’t see that at all we just saw another example of a takeover or misuse of power and the country stumbling from crisis to crisis. It was a different atmosphere.…In Chile I had had three sort of assigned portfolios and I knew them specifically. In Argentina, as I recall, we reacted more ad hoc, whoever happened to have the time to write the latest report or follow something….

Even when the military were in, the political parties were still important. They were never formally dissolved. I remember going to receptions where the politicians all talked who was up and who was down and who was involved with the military and who was not, again quite different from the situation in Chile, where the politicians were literally for the first year or two out of sight. They kept very carefully out of sight. In Argentina, no — life continued on much more normally.

The people who had changes in their lives were largely on the left, those the military had identified as dissident or problem makers. The embassy was not as polarized, as I recall. The embassy in Chile was quite polarized, the military and some of the [Central Intelligence] Agency people and some of the others. That didn’t happen in Argentina, partly because the passions were so much less….

Did the Argentineans look to Europe more than to the United States? I think so, yes. The connections were very much there. There were very few Americans other than some businesspeople there. They looked back to Spain, to Italy, to other countries.…

It was interesting to me to see in Argentina, also in Chile and other countries but emphasized in Argentina, the communities that were there, the country club which is the one for the British community, and there’s another one that was specialized for the Italians and there was another for the Spanish, and there was a Jewish club. They were not exclusive but clearly it was a community’s center, and Argentina was very much a collection of communities rather than an integrated nation, which I think is one of their problems…

My impression has been though that labor was extremely politicized in that country. It is in many Latin American countries, but there particularly labor tends to be an arm of a political party, the labor union will be an arm of a political party rather than a real, what we call, independent labor union. There are some in this country would say the AFL-CIO is an arm of the Democratic Party, but down there it really is. The labor union would be integrated pretty much. …It affected those who were affected, in the sense that if your son was taken or your family was involved in the political activity and they were targeted, yes, you were affected.

But I don’t think that it was something that affected the majority of Argentines. The man in the street wasn’t being beaten up by the police, and these were the students or the young people who were in trouble and there weren’t that many of them. Many of them had lost, I think, a great deal of sympathy because of assassinations and kidnappings and things.

There was some attitude I remember hearing once from someone I thought was a very liberal-minded Argentine when somebody had just been found assassinated and disappeared, “Well, he had it coming. They were troublemakers.” It wasn’t that it affected such wide numbers of people. They were more worried about their economic, I think, than their political situation.

They didn’t like the publicity, of course. Skatīsimies patiesībai acīs. Many of them were humane people after all, and they didn’t like to see people being killed or tortured. I don’t think the majority of Argentines would have overthrown their arms because of that type of thing. The thing which the Argentine military did which forced them out of power was the stupid war in the Falklands. The dumbest thing they ever did.…

“These were people who never had Argentine passports, who had resided for generations and still had these European passports”

Gary S. Urey
Consular Officer, Embassy Buenos Aires, 1976-1978

USREY: Only until quite late in my tour did we become fully aware of the dirty war that had been going on almost this whole period. That they had been putting away their own people. I got involved in that.…

The junta, after getting much bad international press, had decided to give this much talked about derecho de opcion, right of option, which effectively meant that if you were a political prisoner, and you didn’t have outrageous charges against you, if you would give up your Argentine nationality, and agree to exile yourself permanently from the country, the right of option, you could leave, if another country would take you.

I found myself going into jails interviewing people, to see if they would be eligible to come to the U.S. So, I got some great reporting and stories to end on. The present conditions, and so on. That began to cloud the whole experience.…

Oddly enough, you had a lot of Argentines, itself a target of immigration from Europe, doing secondary immigration to the U.S. It was very, very interesting. I always thought that was the big difference between Argentina and the U.S. in many ways. You had many, many people in Argentina with Spanish passports, or Italian passports, or German passports, who had lived there several generations, whereas in the U.S., there was always an urge to become an American. Argentines were always going back to the madre pais [“mother country”].

Argentina was never really home. It was a sort of transit place.…These were people who never had Argentine passports, who had resided for generations and still had these European passports. I always felt it was greatly to the discredit of Argentina. You had to feel that this was a bad blot on their part. This was supposed to have been one of the great American republics, and it was falling apart. But, the living was so good, the weather was good, the buildings and the architecture were magnificent. The food was superb. The people, like you say, you never saw so many clear eyes and white skin. It’s the biggest white city I have ever been in, including Europe. When you go to Paris, you see people of all colors. This is 12 million white people, with only an occasional dark Brazilian on the street. It was an astonishing big pool of human resources, not doing particularly well.

Human rights policy

Anthony Freeman
Assistant Labor Attaché, Embassy Buenos Aires, 1976-1980

FREEMAN: By now, the human rights policy of the Carter Administration was in full swing and there were strong denunciations out of Washington concerning the violations of human rights in Argentina.

The first signs of a human rights policy actually had surfaced a bit earlier in the Nixon Administration when I was in Sao Paulo, and I had gained some experience as political officer cultivating middle-class liberal opponents of the military regime in Brazil, expressing U.S. concern about the heavy-handed military repression there.

But the Carter Administration’s strong emphasis on human rights policy was not the only U.S. interest in Argentina. We didn’t want to see the leftist guerrillas tortured to death and then “disappeared” in secret operations, let alone innocent civilians labeled as terrorists, arbitrarily detained and then disposed of in the same way, but I believe we recognized it was in the U.S. interest to see the guerrilla threat eliminated. We wanted the guerrillas dealt with by rule of law and some semblance of due process. When I say “we” I mean the U.S. government.

It’s conceivable there may have been some people in the Administration in Washington who harbored a more benign view of Argentina’s rebellious youth, but professionals in the State Department (and certainly the Pentagon) saw the guerrillas as a threat to U.S. interests in Latin America. The political model they appeared to vaguely espouse was some kind of collectivist or totalitarian society, whether of the radical left or right or some hybrid thereof, and they used terrorist methods.

They were the enemies not only of the current military dictators of Argentina, but also of the liberal democratic tradition in Argentine political history, represented by the civilian governments Argentina had known in the past. They were clearly anti-American. If they ever succeeded in attaining power, there was no doubt they would take Argentina on an anti- American, “anti-imperialist” path, whether directly into the Cuban-Soviet orbit outright or into the “non-aligned” camp. And so it was in our interest to see them defeated, but we preferred this done by civilized rules and not the way the Argentine military and police were doing it.

As far as I can remember, however, U.S. concern over the latent threat represented by the insurgency was not articulated publicly. This may have been signaled or intimated in informal (and possibly even unauthorized) conversations between Embassy staff and Argentine government and military officials, but I don’t think publicly. I would need to research this to be sure my reflections on this point are accurate but, officially, I think, the U.S. took a hands-off posture as to this internal rebellion in Argentina and the government’s decision to defeat it militarily, except to express concern over the human rights aspects.

The Argentine counterinsurgency was carried out in good, Machiavellian fashion. I had the notion of a great deal of deception going on and imagined there were operations where Army units pretended to be from the Navy, or vice versa, just to hide their unit’s identity and defend themselves from any future acts of retribution (or justice). The intelligence services would hire thugs, who did a lot of the underground killing that went on. “The Dirty War” as they called it.

The French had started this kind of thing in Algeria, I think, and I suspect the Argentines had learned from the French how to do it. This was their operating style, and there were trade union elements right in the middle, either on one side or the other. Some of the labor leaders were suspected of harboring sympathy toward the guerrillas and some were with the government, or at least they were against the guerrillas.

The Malvinas/Falkland Crisis – The Beginning of the End

Robert Morley
ARA Policy Planning Coordinator, 1979-1982

MORLEY: Let me say that we understood and for some time had followed closely the dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Malvinas/Falklands issue. Negotiations had reached a dead end.

But no one really expected that the Argentines would actually invade and occupy the islands. It was a total surprise. When it happened, few believed that the Brits had the will or the capability to take the islands back….

It was viewed as a gambit by the government of Argentina. The government of Argentina had lost a lot of its credibility and a lot of its influence, a lot of its support among the Argentine people. We felt at the time that the seizure of the islands by the Argentine military was an attempt to restore the popularity of the Argentine government, to give it a new lease on life.

I think that this assumption was correct. I remember reading reports from our embassy in Buenos Aires that the people of Argentina apparently supported very strongly the invasion. There were big demonstrations in front of the presidential palace and elsewhere in favor of this decision by the military government.…

Britain had laid its prestige on the line, while an Argentine withdrawal would mean the demise of the military regime in Buenos Aires….

The British invaded and took the [islands] back. The Argentines seemed ill-prepared to resist the British. Reportedly, after their successful seizure of the islands, the Argentine Government had decided to withdraw their invasion force and replace it with units of lesser quality. Less capable garrison type troops were sent to the islands to maintain control. So, I don’t really think Buenos Aires expected a serious military response on the part of the British.

A lot of Latins viewed the government of Argentina as undesirable. On the other hand, a number of the governments of South America at least were military at the time. So the responses, the reactions of the various governments of South America, which were the key to the whole thing, ranged all over the place. I think it can be said that the Chileans and probably the Uruguayans tended to lean toward the British, although not actively supporting the British. The Peruvians, if I remember correctly, actively supported the Argentines, providing military equipment. The Brazilians stayed studiously neutral. So, there was a wide range of responses from the South American governments for whom the crisis was most germane.

In many cases, it was for reasons perhaps unrelated to the Malvinas/Falklands crisis itself. Argentina and Chile were traditional enemies. So, if Argentina was in trouble, at least diplomatically, the Chileans were going to lean toward whoever was giving Argentina problems.

There are a lot of historical ties between Uruguay and Great Britain that probably influenced that government to take at least a benign view toward British activities in the area.…

It became evident to the Argentine public that the military not only couldn’t handle economics and politics and didn’t have a decent human rights record, it couldn’t even do what they were supposed to be experts at — that is, conduct an effective military campaign. So, they lost all credibility as a result of their adventurism.

As the outcome of the conflict became clearer, our assumption was that it would strengthen our hand in terms of restoring democracy to Argentina. This is what we were saying to the seventh floor [of the State Department, where the Secretary and other senior officials have their offices] and to the White House in position papers, that there was some good coming out of this. It probably hastened the demise of the Argentine government and a return to democracy. That’s what happened.

Free Elections and the Transition to Democracy

John Bushnell
DCM Buenos Aires, 1982-87

BUSHNELL: Although the military government greatly increased its prestige and mandate with the invasion – thousands were dancing in the streets of Buenos Aires – all that gain and much more was lost with the military’s defeat. The military not only had to change its leaders, but it had to call for elections and begin the process of turning the country back to the civilian politicians.

Q: And Galtieri [Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, Argentine general and President of Argentina from December 1981 to June 1982, during the last military dictatorship known officially as the National Reorganization Process] was out on his ear pretty soon, succeeded by Bignone?

BUSHNELL: Yes, the military was defeated and in trouble domestically. The tradition in Argentina was that the military would take over, rule for two or three years, and then turn the government back to the civilians. This scenario had happened in a repetitive cycle for nearly a hundred years since the emergence of middle-class political parties. Before that the military just ruled most of the time. General Reynaldo Bignone was appointed essentially as a caretaker to prepare for and hold elections.

Q: There was an election on October 30th of 1983, and his job was to prepare for the election?

BUSHNELL: He announced, almost as soon as he came in, they were going to have elections and then set the time and opened up the political process. It was a free and open campaign and election.…

The main issue was: Would the military allow a free and open election and would they allow the person elected to take over even if it were the candidate less sympathetic to the military? There are two major parties in Argentina: Peronists, the party established by Juan Peron in the 1940’s and supported by most labor organizations and Radicals, largely a party of the urban middle-class. The Peronists are often authoritarian, and the military were more comfortable with them.

[Peronist] Italo Luder was the candidate, a moderate lawyer. The Radical ticket was headed by Raul Alfonsin. The election was free, and there was plenty of debate. Various groups tried to get the U.S. involved or present us as favoring one candidate or the other. My challenge was to support the return to democracy but to be absolutely neutral between the candidates. We had to be careful about even visiting candidates to avoid speculation on a possible U.S. role.

The opinion polls leading up to the election indicated that it would be close, but most polls showed Luder winning. There were no significant problems on election day. I drove around the city and saw several polling places. At some there were long lines in late morning and early afternoon….

Luder was favored but there were some pundits who thought the Radicals could win. In a country team meeting not long before the election, I did an informal poll of what officers guessed the outcome would be. Of course, political officers did not count any more than consular and administrative officers. The majority thought that Luder would win, which is where I put my hand up, but a significant minority, maybe a third of the country team thought Alfonsin would win.…

One of the challenges for the Foreign Service is to use all the tools of quiet diplomacy effectively to attain our objectives when there is not a crisis and there is not much if any guidance from Washington. The U.S. objective in Argentina for years had been a return to democracy. We didn’t really care who won, but we wanted the election to happen, and we wanted the elected person to take over.

The threat was that the military would either stop the election or, more likely in my view, not allow Alfonsin to take over if he won.

Thus I tried to mobilize all the resources of the country team to encourage compliance with the electoral process. For example, our military officers, both the attachés and the military group personnel, stressed to their counterparts how essential moving to an elected government was to normalizing our military relationships and restoring the supply line of spare parts for the American equipment which was the backbone of the Argentine

I used my contacts with the Radicals to suggest that they make contact with military leaders to give them confidence that a Radical government would not try to eliminate the military as an institution. Many Argentines did not consider us a friendly country at that time, but we at least had a lot contacts through whom we could get our message across and plant seeds that might strengthen the democratic process.

I went out of my way in my first year in Buenos Aires to meet most of the senior military officers, including some who had retired. I mentioned [photo at right (Corbis), President of Argentina from March to December, General Roberto] Viola, whom I’d seen with Haig in Washington, who was then retired. He would come to my house for lunch, just the two of us, and he would tell me what the senior military were thinking. He could also plant ideas with the active-duty military, because, after all, they all worked for him at one time.

By the end of 1982 the attachés could attract middle-to- senior level officers to their parties. I often went to these parties to meet these officers and advance my own understanding of what they were thinking. I developed a number of examples of how civilian control of the military in the U.S. benefitted the military, and I repeated these, it seemed endlessly. I also cultivated several civilians who, although they held no official position, were close to the most senior military.

“The general was mulling whether the military could live with an Alfonsin government”

About a week before the election, a businessman Peronist, who had been to my house several times, called me and said the First Corps commander really needed to meet with me. Argentina is divided into four corps, which are regional army headquarters, and virtually all fighting forces are directly under the control of one of the corps commanders. The First Corps is the most powerful for two reasons.

First, the corps is headquartered in the Buenos Aires suburbs and is responsible for the capital of the country, the site of government and the richest area. Second, the armored division which had most of the tanks was part of the First Corp traditionally any coup would be led by the armored division and the elite troops stationed in and around Buenos Aires.

I had not met the First Corps commander, who had a reputation of being hardline and not moving outside his immediate military circle. I agreed to meet him at his headquarters at his convenience. I knew he had something serious to discuss when the intermediary came back with an invitation for me to have dinner alone with the general in his personal quarters. This dinner a week before the election was the only time in my five years in Argentina that I dined alone with an active-duty general in his personal quarters. It was a difficult moment, a real test of quiet diplomacy.

It was clear, once we quickly got over the formalities, that the general was mulling in his mind whether or not the military could live with an Alfonsin government. I could tell that he was under a lot of pressure from other military officers who thought a Radical government would be a disaster.

He wanted me, first of all, to assure him that Luder was going to win. Of course, there was no way I could. I said Luder was my guess, but elections are tricky things and you can’t tell.

He went through all the problems a Radical government might create for most of dinner. I mildly countered some of these, but it was clear the concern was more emotional than analytical.

Finally, I said to him I really didn’t understand, although I’d been listening carefully and was sympathetic, why he was so concerned.

I said, “It is my observation that Alfonsin and the Radicals don’t have any guns and that you, the army, have all the guns, and after the inauguration Alfonsin still would not have any guns. You will have all the guns. So Alfonsin’s options vis-à-vis the Army are limited. If he is elected, he’s got a popular mandate you can’t just disregard him officers will have to leave civilian positions the Army budget may be cut some, but you have a strong position, and you should have confidence in the Army’s position.”

He explained that the military had had to throw out every Radical government in the history of Argentina, and he said he did not think the Radicals had changed they hate the military. I said I was quite sure the Radicals had changed in one respect. The Radicals were at least as aware as the military how all previous Radical governments had ended, and they would work hard to complete their five years.

I was able to tell him that I had discussed this issue with several Radical leaders, but not Alfonsin himself, and they knew they would have to work with the military to strengthen the institution in the light of recent events.…

Quickly after he was elected in October 1983, Alfonsin named his cabinet or at least much of his cabinet, and he named his main political operative, who really won the close election for him by organizing supporting groups in the provinces, as Defense Minister.…Borras was his name.

As soon as he was named, I invited him to a private lunch at the DCM residence (I seldom used the Ambassador’s residence to entertain when I was chargé except for the largest functions). He started right off by saying he knew nothing about what a Defense Minister does. He was a politician, and a good one I might add, a builder of compromise and coalition.

Alfonsin had said to him, “Our biggest problem is the military, so I’m going to put my best man in the Defense Ministry.” We talked extensively about how to organize the Ministry, how civilians might relate to the military command structure, and how gradually to take control, recognizing that the military has the guns. He came to lunch several times because he said our discussions gave him ideas. I noticed that he smoked one cigarette after another although he did not otherwise appear to be a nervous man.

The new government had major economic problems the military issues were very difficult, especially the question of punishing the military for past human rights abuses. Moreover, the Radicals had been out of power for a long time lots of Radicals wanted jobs, and not all of them were honest. The U.S. had major interests riding on the way they solved these problems.

This type of situation is where an embassy, through what we might call traditional non-crisis diplomacy – by what people on the ground can do that people from a distance can’t do – can make a big difference. That’s why I wanted to develop relationships to promote civilian control of the military.…

“Argentina really had institutional and political problems”

Nicolas Robertson
Embassy Buenos Aires, Assistant Public Affairs Officer, 1984-1988

ROBERTSON: All this democratization in Latin America is sort of old hat now everybody assumes that you will have elected transitions. Before 1982, though, the Argentine military government was really, really awful. And not only did it look awful you didn’t see any hope, nothing that could get them out of there. Then all of a sudden Argentina had a transition, the Peronists didn’t win, the Argentines became briefly reflective and self-critical. There was really serious discussion about how they came to this path of economic collapse and political stasis.…

The government dealt with the disappeared and the stolen children, but it was only one of many issues. I remember that the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo were in President Alfonsin’s office harassing him about something and they said he should devote all his time to resolving the cases of the disappeared.

He replied that there was a country to run, and there were other issues to deal with as well. And it was painful — even at that time, there were people who didn’t believe that their children had died. They charged that they were being kept in a camp by Alfonsin for some reason, a camp hidden in Patagonia. It ceased to be a rational legal issue for a certain number of people. And, of course, one of the sad things about the Kirchner government is their attempts to re-vindicate the Montoneros.

Argentina really had institutional and political problems. I mean, they had to sort out how you actually run a democratic system, what can you do, what you can’t do. And there are two elements of our focus down there and one was economics, the second was developing democratic institutions.


Policy & History

The United States established diplomatic relations with Argentina in 1823 following Argentina’s independence from Spain. The bilateral relationship between the United States and Argentina is based on shared interests including science and technology, education, trade, regional peace and stability, non-proliferation, cultural exchanges, human rights, and social inclusion. The Government of Argentina shares U.S. national and international security goals through participation in international peacekeeping operations and advocacy for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

U.S.-Argentine cooperation includes science and technology initiatives in the fields of space, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, agricultural research and biotechnology, medicine, and the environment. The first bilateral joint science and technology working group meeting was held in 2010 a follow-up meeting was held in 2014. In 2011, the United States and Argentina signed an agreement on the peaceful uses of outer space, and in 2015 NASA and Argentina’s space agency (CONAE) signed a bilateral agreement related to heliophysics. The United States and Argentina also have a binational energy working group.

There is an active Fulbright Commission in Argentina which oversees educational exchange scholarships in Argentina and in the United States.

Bilateral Economic Relations

The United States is one of Argentina’s largest trading partners with a historic high of $23 billion in trade in goods and services in 2012. U.S. exports to Argentina include machinery, oil, organic chemicals, and plastic. U.S. imports from Argentina include mineral fuel and oil, aluminum, wine, iron and steel products, and preserved foods. The two countries have signed a bilateral investment treaty, and more than 500 U.S. companies are among the top investors in the country with nearly $20 billion invested in Argentina as of 2013. U.S. direct investment in Argentina is mostly in industry/agriculture, natural resources, finance, and services. In 2007, the U.S. and Argentina modernized a bilateral civil aviation agreement to update safety and security and provide for more-frequent flights between the two countries, allowing for increased volumes of tourism and business travel.

Argentina’s Membership in International Organizations

Argentina and the United States are active participants in many of the same international organizations and forums, including the United Nations, Organization of American States, International Atomic Energy Agency, the G-20, and the World Trade Organization. Argentina completed its eighth rotating membership as a member of the UN Security Council at the end of 2014.


The Rise of New Latin American Socialism

Argentina could be considered one of the more socialist countries in Central or South America. Other countries, notably Ecuador, Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela, have strong ties to socialist movements. Some of Argentina's neighbors are less socialist, and these include Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and Saint Lucia.

The Latin American region has a long history of populist, socialist, and communist movements. For example, the political waves led by Salvador Allende in Chile, the National Liberation Army in Colombia, and Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba. By the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, most of these movements had petered out.

This modern wave of Latin American socialism can be seen as a direct response to failed attempts at international development efforts by supranational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, many countries in the region leaned on foreign loans, printed large quantities of money, and focused on their respective balances of trade. These policies were subsequently blamed for poor economic performance and rising levels of inequality, according to the Gini index.

No country declined as rapidly or as severely as Argentina. In 1989 the average inflation rate in Argentina approached 5,000%, and in March 1990 it peaked at over 20,000%. The country defaulted on its loan obligations, and international investing dried up.


A Brief History of Argentina

Before Europeans came to Argentina it was thinly populated. In the Northwest, people grew crops such as potatoes and squash. They sometimes lived in walled towns and they used metal and made pottery. However, most of the indigenous people lived by hunting animals and gathering plants. They continued their hunter-gatherer lifestyle until the late 19th century.

Europeans arrived in what is now Argentina in the 16th century. In 1516 Juan de Solis reached the River Plate but he was killed by the natives. He was followed by Sebastian Cabot who reached the River Plate area in 1526. Then in 1536 Pedro de Mendoza led an expedition to the area and he built a fort. However, the Spaniards were forced to withdraw by hostile natives.

Nevertheless later in the 16th century, several towns were founded in the Northwest of what is now Argentina. Buenos Aires was founded in 1580 to give access to the sea. Yet the southern part of Argentina was left in the hands of the natives. Finally, in 1776 a new Viceroy of the River Plate was formed with Buenos Aires as its capital.

In 1806 the British captured Buenos Aires but they were forced to withdraw. In 1807 they attacked the city again but they were repelled. Nevertheless, links between Argentina and Spain weakened in the early 19th century especially after 1808 when Napoleon forced the Spanish king to abdicate and made his own brother king of Spain. Finally, on 25 May 1810, the Viceroy was deposed and a junta took control of Argentina. However, the junta did not break all links with Spain until 1816. The United Provinces of the River Plate was declared on 9 July 1816.

At first, the United Provinces consisted of what is now Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay. However, the new state was bitterly divided between unitarists who wanted a strong central government and federalists who wanted a loose federation of provinces.

Eventually, in the 1820s the new state broke up. Bolivia became independent in 1825 and Uruguay was created as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil in 1828 after a war between the two countries.

In 1835 General Juan Manuel de Rosas became dictator of Argentina. He was a federalist but ironically he introduced a strong (and repressive) central government. However, Rosas eventually alienated many people in the provinces, and in 1852 a rebellion removed him from power.

Until the late 19th century the natives of Southern Argentina lived in their traditional way. However, in 1879 General Julio Rica led an army to conquer them. The Conquest of the Desert was over by 1880.

Meanwhile, the first railroad in Argentina was built in 1857. It was followed by many others. By 1900 there were over 10,000 miles of railroad in Argentina and by 1912 over 20,000 miles. The railways made it much easier to transport produce to the coast for export. Argentina exported meat, wool, and grain and by 1900 she was the richest country in South America.

Meanwhile, the population of Argentina boomed partly due to immigrants from Spain and Italy. By the end of the century, the population of Argentina was about 4 million.

In the 1920s Argentina was the 7th richest country in the world. However Argentina, like the rest of the world, was affected by the Wall Street Crash.

In 1930 the army staged a coup and General Jose F. Uriburu became president of Argentina. Uriburu called an election in 1931 (although a major party, the Radical Party was banned from taking part). Another election was held in 1937. Despite many accusations of electoral fraud, Roberto Ortiz became president with Ramon Castillo as vice-president. Ill health forced Ortiz to hand over power to Castillo in 1940. However, in 1943 the army staged another coup.

In January 1944 Argentina severed diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. Finally on 27 March 1945, Argentina declared war on Germany. n After the 1943 coup Juan Peron gradually emerged as the leader. In 1946 he was elected president. Peron introduced a number of welfare measures and nationalized industries. Peron was re-elected in 1951 but he gradually lost support. In 1955 a revolution called the Revolution of Liberation forced Peron to flee abroad.

Several short-lived governments followed. In 1958 Arturo Frondizi was elected president of Argentina but the military removed him in 1962. More elections were held in 1963 and Dr. Arturo Illia became president. The military removed him in 1966.

However military dictatorship did not bring peace. In May 1969 rioting broke out in Cordoba. The unrest spread throughout Argentina. Meanwhile, inflation raged.

Yet in 1973 the army allowed more elections and the Peronists (supporters of Peron) won. A Peronist called Hector Campora became president. Peron then returned from exile and Campora resigned to make way for him. More elections were held in September 1973 and Peron became president. However, Peron died in 1974 and his widow Isabel Peron took power. Under her rule inflation and unrest continued. Finally, in March 1976, the army seized power again.

Argentina then suffered a brutal military dictatorship during which thousands of people ‘disappeared’ during a ‘dirty war’. Meanwhile, inflation continued to rage and Argentina became heavily indebted.

In the early 1980s, despite the repression protests spread across Argentina. To try and divert people’s minds from their problems the junta invaded the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982. However, the war turned into a disaster when the British quickly recaptured the islands.

Meanwhile, the Argentinean economy was in dire straits. Eventually, the junta allowed elections in October 1983. Raul Alfonsin took office on 13 December 1983.

However, Alfonsin was unable to solve the problem of hyperinflation in Argentina despite austerity plans introduced in 1985 and 1987. In 1989 Alfonsin handed over power peacefully to the next elected president Carlos Saul Menem. During the 1990s Menem managed to curb inflation and he privatized industry.

In 2001-2002 Argentina suffered a severe recession. However, the economy then grew strongly for a few years. Today the economy of Argentina is growing steadily.

Meanwhile, in October 2007 Cristina Kirchner became the first elected woman president of Argentina. Then in 2015, Mauricio Macri was elected president. In 2020 the population of Argentina was 45 million.

Buenosairesa


Skatīties video: Argentīnas Republikas vēstnieka akreditācija 19062012